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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 970483-CA 
v. : 
HONG NGUYEN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery, 
a first degree felony (reduced to second degree felony) , in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995), in the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (Supp. 
1997) . 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Was aggravated robbery established by evidence that defendant 
brandished a screwdriver and threatened to kill a car owner who 
interrupted defendant's vehicle burglary? 
"In a jury trial in a criminal proceeding, [this Court will] 
review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury verdict." State 
v. Ortiz. 782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1989) (citation omitted), 
cert, denied.795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). It will "reverse a jury 
conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so 
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
This case involves the following statutes, which are reproduced 
in addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (Supp. 1996); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp. 1996); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(2)(d) (Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Information with aggravated robbery, 
a first degree felony (R. 6). At trial, the jury was instructed 
on aggravated robbery and the lesser included offense of burglary 
of a vehicle, a class A misdemeanor (R. 68-69, 76) . The jury 
convicted defendant as charged (R. 77). 
On defendant's uncontested motion, the court entered a judgment 
of conviction for a second degree felony and sentenced defendant 
accordingly (R. 86-89). Defendant timely appealed (R. 95, 97-98). 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
At about 1 a.m. one morning, Robert Carper drove to the Westerner 
Club to give a friend a ride home (R. Ill: 45-46) . He parked near 
the club, met his friend inside, then walked back to the parking 
lot to get his car (R. Ill: 46-47). As he approached his parked 
car, he noticed a figure inside it (R. Ill: 47). When he reached 
the car, he saw defendant inside trying the pry the car stereo out 
with a screwdriver (R. Ill: 48, 54, 70).2 
Carper demanded to know what defendant "thought he was doing"; 
defendant turned around, "brandished a screwdriver" by pointing it 
at Carper, and told him to "back off or he would kill [him]" (R. 
Ill: 48-49, 57-58). Carper took the threat seriously and backed 
off about four feet (R. Ill: 49, 70). 
Defendant climbed out of the window and "kind of swung the 
screwdriver" at Carper, missing him by about a foot (R. Ill: 4 9-51) . 
Carper again backed off and kicked defendant in the chest to "keep 
him away from me" (R. Ill: 50, 71) . Defendant then "took off running" 
(R. Ill: 50-51). 
Carper pursued defendant and eventually pushed or knocked him 
to the ground (R. Ill: 51, 68, 76). A security guard then intervened, 
1
 Except as noted, facts are stated in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1205-06 (Utah 1993); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 
1989). 
2
 Defendant had entered the car by throwing a rock through 
the window (R. Ill: 48, 52-53). 
3 
handcuffing defendant and retrieving the screwdriver from the gutter 
nearby (R. Ill: 51, 77-80). It was a standard screwdriver, about 
six inches long, with a wooden handle (R. Ill: 79, 86). 
Carper never lost sight of defendant from the moment he saw 
him in the car until Carper apprehended him (R. Ill: 54).3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State introduced credible, uncontroverted testimony supporting 
every element of the crime of aggravated robbery. Even assuming 
arguendo the truth of defendant's contentions, they succeed in showing 
only that his conduct fell outside the popular stereotype of 
aggravated robbery as a stickup. 
ARGUMENT 
REASONABLE MINDS COULD CONCLUDE THAT THE ELEMENTS OF 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY WERE SATISFIED BY UNCONTROVERTED 
TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT BRANDISHED A SCREWDRIVER AND 
THREATENED TO KILL A CAR OWNER WHO INTERRUPTED DEFENDANT' S 
VEHICLE BURGLARY 
Defendant claims that the trial evidence was insufficient to 
establish his "intent to commit aggravated robbery" and that his 
"actions do not constitute the sort of violent armed encounter 
contemplated by the aggravated robbery statute." Br. Aplt. at 6. 
3
 Although defense counsel's cross-examination dwelt on a 
set of keys that Carper found in his car (see R. Ill: 61-66, 73-
74), the keys were not introduced by either party and had no 
significance in the case. Any slight relevance the keys might 
have had, had the State or the defense chosen to introduce them, 
would have gone to defendant's identity and not, as defendant now 
claims, to his intent. See Br. Aplt. at 12 n.7. 
4 
He asks this Court to reverse his conviction for aggravated robbery 
and "enter judgment for the lesser included offense of burglary of 
a vehicle." I£.; see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204 (1995). 
"In a jury trial in a criminal proceeding, [this Court will] 
review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury verdict." State 
v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1989) (citation omitted), 
cert, denied,795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). It will "reverse a jury 
conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so 
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." Id. 
A. Reasonable minds could easily conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the trial evidence satisfied 
the elements of aggravated robbery. 
Robbery. A person commits robbery if "the person intentionally 
or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against another 
in the course of committing a theft." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (b) 
(Supp. 1996).4 An act is committed "*in the course of committing 
a theft' if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of 
theft, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission." 
Utah Code Ann. § § 76-6-301(2) (Supp. 1996) (see addendum A for full 
text of statute). 
4
 The jury was instructed on this alternative of robbery 
(see R. 68). 
5 
The perpetrator' s intent "need not be proved by direct evidence," 
State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114, 119 (UtahApp. 1992) (citations omitted), 
but "may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the accused, the 
nature of the weapon used by defendant and manner in which it was 
used, taken together with all the other circumstances in the case." 
State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1982), overruled in part 
on other grounds bv State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 848 n.5 (Utah 1992) . 
Uncontroverted trial evidence established that, when Carper 
confronted defendant, defendant had broken into Carper's car and 
was attempting to pry the car stereo loose with a screwdriver. See 
p. 3 herein. From this testimony the jury could reasonably infer 
that defendant was "in the course of committing a theft" when he 
pointed the screwdriver at Robert Carper and threatened to kill him. 
Indeed, defendant does not contest this conclusion. See Br. Aplt. 
at 15-16. 
Uncontroverted evidence also established that defendant 
"brandished" the screwdriver, pointed it at Carper, and threatened 
to kill him. See p. 3 herein. Carper took the threat seriously 
and backed off about four feet. Id. After getting out of the car, 
defendant swung the screwdriver at Carper, missing him by about a 
foot, and causing Carper to back off again. Jd. 
From this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that 
defendant "intentionally or knowingly" used the fear of immediate 
force against Carper. Indeed, the conclusion seems inescapable. 
6 
Nothing in the trial testimony would support a contrary inference, 
that is, that defendant's threat to kill Carper with the screwdriver 
was innocent (e.g., joking), accidental, negligent, or reckless. 
The evidence was therefore sufficient to convict defendant of 
robbery. 
Dangerous weapon. A robbery is aggravated if the perpetrator 
"uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon" in the course of 
committing the robbery. § 76-6-302 (1995). 
The definitional section of Utah's criminal code defines 
"dangerous weapon" in part as an "item capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (a) (Supp. 1996) . 
Also instructive is Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(2)(d) (Supp. 
1996).5 It defines "dangerous weapon" in terms of use: a "dangerous 
weapon" is "any item that in the manner of its use or intended use 
is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Id. 
Similarly, one factor for determining whether an item "not commonly 
known as a dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon" is "the manner 
in which the instrument, object, or thing was used." Utah Code Ann. 
5
 Although Utah Code Ann. § '76-10-501(2)(d) (Supp. 1996) 
defines "dangerous weapon" for purposes of weapons offenses, the 
Utah Supreme Court has cited it in determining whether a 
screwdriver was a "dangerous weapon" for purposes of the 
aggravated assault statute. See State v. Walker, 765 P.2d 874, 
874 (Utah 1988) (per curiam). Defendant also tacitly concedes 
its relevance. See Br. Aplt. at 9. 
7 
§ § 76-10-501(2) (d) (iii) (Supp. 1996). (See addendum A for full 
text of statutes.) 
When a screwdriver is used as a weapon, such as when it is held 
to a rape victim's neck, a jury is fully justified in concluding 
that it is a "'dangerous weapon" under these statutes. See State 
v. Walker, 765 P.2d 874, 874 (Utah 1988) (affirming aggravated sexual 
assault conviction). See also State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 
(Utah 1985) ("tools such as knives and screwdrivers . . . [may] be 
used as weapons") (citation omitted). 
Here, defendant used a standard screwdriver, about six inches 
long, with a wooden handle (R. Ill: 79, 86) .6 He used it as a weapon, 
threatening to kill Carper and even attempting to stab him with it. 
On these facts, the jury acted reasonably and lawfully in concluding 
that the screwdriver qualified as a "dangerous weapon." 
The evidence was therefore sufficient to convict defendant of 
aggravated robbery. 
B. Defendant's arguments do not address the statutory 
elements of the crime. 
Defendant contends that he did not threaten Carper "in order 
to unlawfully seize'' his property; that he "did not employ the 
screwdriver against Carper in order to gain initial access to the 
Camaro and did not produce the screwdriver for the sole purpose of 
6
 Although for unexplained reasons the screwdriver was not 
offered at trial, there was no disagreement as to its description 
or the effect its use had on Carper. 
8 
threatening Carper"; that "Carper did not view the screwdriver as 
enough of a threat to deter him from verbally and physically 
challenging" defendant; that an enraged Carper had to be separated 
from defendant; that defendant went to the crime scene intending 
11
 at most, to break into Carper's car" and not to commit aggravated 
robbery; that defendant "in no measure contemplated an armed 
encounter"; that he did not commit "a violent assault upon a victim 
by use of a weapon in order to unlawfully steal the victim's 
property"; that other aggravated robberies involved more "egregious 
and violent behavior"; that defendant hoped "to avoid a personal 
encounter"; that defendant "never actually touched Carper's person"; 
and that "the screwdriver is not an inherently dangerous weapon of 
force, the very presence of which justifies a conviction of aggravated 
robbery." Br. Aplt. at 9-14. 
Even assuming arguendo the truth of these contentions, they 
miss the point. None of these factors are elements of aggravated 
robbery. Defendant succeeds in showing only that his conduct fell 
outside the popular stereotype of aggravated robbery as a stickup.7 
7
 Defendant's attempt to paint his victim as the aggressor 
and blame the victim for defendant's death threat and stabbing 
attempt, see Br. Aplt. at 14, fails to view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict. 
Defendant brandished the screwdriver and issued his death 
threat—thus completing the crime of aggravated robbery—in 
response to Carper's asking, "what do you think you're doing?" 
(R. Ill: 49), an appropriate question under the circumstances. 
Similarly, that Carper would defend himself with his feet when 
attacked with a screwdriver does not justify defendant's conduct. 
A person "engaged in stealing another person's property" may 
(continued...) 
9 
Similarly, that additional evidence might have been "pertinent 
and helpful," Br. Aplt. at 12, is not the test of the sufficiency 
of evidence. All that is required is that the evidence adduced at 
trial be sufficient to convict, which here it was. 
Defendant also contests the "aggravated" character of his 
conviction, arguing that on these facts an "aggravated robbery 
conviction does not serve the statutory distinction between 
^aggravated' offenses and less egregious conduct . . ." Br. Aplt. 
at 12-13. On the contrary, the "statutory distinction" between 
aggravated robbery and simple robbery rests on legislatively 
enumerated factors, one of which is the use or threatened use of 
a dangerous weapon. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1) (1995). The 
jury was not, and should not have been, asked to determine how 
"egregious" they believed defendant's conduct to be. 
In any event, this claim is ironic in light of the trial court's 
order reducing his conviction from a first to a second degree felony 
(R. Ill: 86-89); see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995). Defendant 
was sentenced as if he had committed only simple robbery. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-301(3) (Supp. 1996). 
7(...continued) 
expect "that another person will appear unexpectedly and object 
strenuously." State v. Stricklinq, 844 P.2d 979, 984 (Utah App. 
1992) (quoting Carter, 707 P.2d at 660). 
10 
C. Because he was properly convicted of aggravated robbery, 
defendant is not entitled to have his conviction reduced 
to burglary of a vehicle. 
Defendant claims that his conviction should be reversed and 
this Court should enter judgment for burglary of a vehicle, a class 
A misdemeanor. See Br. Aplt. at 15-16; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204 
(1995) . Because his conviction for aggravated robbery is supported 
by the evidence, defendant is not entitled to this relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's aggravated robbery conviction should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT and PUBLISHED OPINION 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the 
State does not request that it be set for oral argument or that a 
published opinion issue. ^^_ 
Lfc RESPECTFULLY submitted on ^H_ February 1998 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
XOW, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
11 
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Addendum A 
76-1-601. Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act* means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor* means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in 
a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of 
physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads 
the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other 
manner that he is in control of such an item. 
(6) "Offense* means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act 
and the actor is capable of acting. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, govern-
ment, partnership, or unincorporated association. 
(9) "Possess* means to have physical possession of or to exercise 
dominion or control over tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death. 
(11) "Substantial bodily injury* means bodily injury, not amounting to 
serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, 
temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function 
of any bodily member or organ. 
(12) "Writing* or "written* includes any handwriting, typewriting, 
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of 
recording information or fixing information in a form capable of being 
preserved. 
History; C. 1953, 76-1-601, enacted hf L. 
1973, eh. 196, f 76-1-601; 1939, eh. 170,1 1; 
1995, eh. 244, t 1* 1995, eh. 291, | 1; 1996, 
ch. 205, | 26. 
Amendment Notes. — Hie 1995 amend-
ment by ch. 244, effecthre May 1,1995, added 
the subsection designations in Subsection (5), 
redesignated fonner Subsections (5Xa) and (b) 
as (5XbXi) and (ii), and made related changes. 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 291, effective 
May 1,1995, added Subsection (11). 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
1996, added Subsection (12) and made a stylis-
ic change. 
76-6-301. Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immedi-
ate force against another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-301, enacted by L. in the possession of another from his person, or 
1973, ch. 196, S 76-6-301; 1995, ch. 222, 9 1* immediate presence, against his will, accom-
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- plished by means of force or fear," added Sub-
ment. effective May 1, 1995, rewrote Subsec- section (2), and redesignated former Subsection^ 
tion (1), which had read "Robbery is the unlaw- (2) as (3). 
ful and intentional taking of personal property 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of «r*^ 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses i • 'ansrerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon,,, another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
ccnirse of committing a robbery if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
7 1 i J I II CRIMINAL CODE 96 
PARTS 
WEAPONS 
76-10 501. Uniform law 1 Mi mil ion si 
(1) (a) The individual right to keep and bear arms being a constitutionally 
protected right, the Legislature finds the need to provide uniform laws 
throughout the state. Except as specifically provided by state law, a citizen 
of the United States or a lawfully admitted alien shall not be: 
(i) prohibited from owning, possessing, purchasing, transporting, 
or keeping any firearm at his place of residence, property, business, or 
in any vehicle under his control; or 
(ii) required to have a permit or license to purchase, own, possess, 
transport, or keep a firearm, 
(b) This part is uniformly applicable throughout this state and in all its 
political subdivisions and municipalities. All authority to regulate fire-
arms shall be reserved to the state except where the Legislature specifi-
cally delegates responsibility to local authorities. Unless specifically 
authorized by the Legislature by statute, a local authority may not enact 
or enforce any ordinance, regulation, or rule pertaining to firearms. 
(2) As used in this part: 
(a) (i) "Concealed dangerous weapon" means a dangerous weapon that 
is covered, hidden, or secreted in a manner that the public would not 
be aware of its presence and is readily accessible for immediate use. 
(ii) A dangerous weapon shall not be considered a concealed dan-
gerous weapon if it is a firearm which is unloaded and is securely 
encased. 
(b) "Crime of violence" means aggravated murder, murder, manslaugh-
ter, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, housebreaking, extor-
tion, or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, assault with a 
dangerous weapon, assault with intent to commit any offense punishable 
by imprisonment for more than one year, arson punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year, or an attempt ta. commit any of these 
offenses. 
(c) "Criminal history background check" means a criminal background 
check conducted by a licensed firearms dealer on every purchaser of a 
handgun through the division or the local law enforcement agency where 
the firearms dealer conducts business. 
(d) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner of its use 
or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. The 
following factors shall be used in determining whether a knife, or any 
other item, object, or thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon 
is a dangerous weapon: 
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing; 
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any; 
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used; 
and 
(iv) the other lawful purposes fin wit instrument, object in 
thing may be used. 
(e) "Dealer* means every person who is licensed under crimes and 
criminal procedure, 18 U.S.C. 923 and engaged in the business of selling, 
leasing, or otherwise transferring a handgun, whether the person is a 
retail or wholesale dealer, pawnbroker, or otherwise. 
